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Neither Separate Nor Equal:
How Race-Sensitive Enforcement of Criminal Laws
Threatens to Undo Brown v. Board of Education
Christian Halliburton1
This year has given our country an opportunity to revisit and to
reconsider the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education2 and to ask questions about how the legacy of Brown has thus far
been realized. Reflecting on Brown, and considering the various ways in
which this single decision reshaped our society, by altering in some
measure what it means to be black and white in America, it becomes clear
how powerful the law can be when it is used to liberate a class of human
beings from a dark chapter in their history of oppression.3 Unfortunately,
judicial declarations promising freedom from discrimination and
segregation do not, as it turns out, guarantee true equality for the formerly
oppressed. Instead, the parasitic “separate but equal” technique of
perpetuating American racial hierarchies and controlling the social mobility
of blacks and other people of color finds an inviting and nourishing new
host in the form of a purportedly race-neutral criminal justice system.
The American version of educational apartheid that the Brown Court
ultimately declared to be incompatible with prevailing notions of liberty and
freedom was a glaring example of parallel systems for blacks and for
whites—parallel systems that perpetuated both the actual and the perceived
psycho-sociological complex of black, second-class citizenship. By explicit
design, segregated schooling both created and reinforced the devaluation of
blacks in our social hierarchy, and created a lasting perception of black
inferiority in the minds of blacks and whites, because of the unflinching
approval with which such disparate treatment was received by the legal
system.4 Under such a regime, explicit discrimination based on race was
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not only the law of the land, but also represented the ordinary course of
business. Black Americans were herded into substandard institutional
settings without adequate consideration of what their humanity (rather than
their race) deserved, and they were denied the opportunity for social
advancement promised by truly equal access to a quality education.
Systematic fairness was expressly denied, and it was a great day for the
nation when this lingering badge of slavery was itself abolished.
Of course, these overt forms of apartheid, parallel social systems for
blacks and whites, or for people of color more generally, could never
withstand the light of even the most modest public scrutiny today. But I
wonder, in light of Brown, if we have not driven the separate but equal
doctrine underground—driven it deeper into the fabric of American society
and deeper into the heart of our legal system as a whole.
I would suggest as an answer to this question that the separate but equal
doctrine and its vampire-like ethos simply refused to die with the mighty
blow struck by Brown. Instead, this doctrine is now lurking more subtly in
the shadows of nominally colorblind legal norms that perpetuate the
differential treatment of blacks and other communities of color, which
constitutes a modern incursion against the very victory whose anniversary
we now celebrate.
I contend that the separate but equal approach to social regulation that
was ostensibly defeated in Brown has never lost its hold on the American
legal community. The Brown decision could not uproot the potential for
disparate, discriminatory treatment of disfavored minorities and
communities of color because it failed to affect a true change of heart for
those human beings who would otherwise resist the idea of racial equality.
Ingeniously, our legal institutions have found myriad outlets for individual
racial animus and have created a forum for the expression of collective bias
that is now cloaked in the language of colorblindness. The output of these
individual and collective expressions of bias, insulated as they are from
personal reflection, public scrutiny, and judicial review, is a modern
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iteration of the famous separate but equal doctrine. In this modern version,
people of color walk through and confront the same formal legal procedures
and proceedings as do their white counterparts, but they substantively
receive a different brand of justice. The separate but equal doctrine lives on
in the form of differential and/or disparate enforcement and application of
domestic criminal laws.
On some basic level, this should not be surprising. The separate but
equal approach to education achieved several ends. The obvious aim of
insulating white children from exposure to “those Negroes,” the latter
deemed unfit to share space (much less a classroom) with their white
neighbors, was well served by an educational apartheid system. But
reserving the most limited, ineffective, and inadequate educational
resources for blacks also served to ensure that blacks’ mobility and
advancement within the larger society was handicapped. Specifically,
limiting access to quality education guaranteed that blacks would continue
to occupy only the lowest rung of the American social hierarchy. But the
continued racialized application of superficially colorblind legal norms
achieves this same effect, and it does so without reliance on overt
judgments or distinctions regarding race. While the gamut of ramifications
that flows from felony arrests and convictions is beyond the scope of this
work, there is no question that such convictions foreclose future educational
opportunities, employment options, and civic participation (including the
right to vote) for the convicted individual. These race-sensitive criminal
convictions, which result in the explicit denial of the educational and
economic opportunity necessary to develop a sophisticated world view,
ensure that each succeeding generation of blacks and other people of color
remain socially and economically marginalized and subject to management
and control by a white-dominated social order.
While the present account cannot capture the entire catalogue of
institutionalized racism, I offer three examples of the dynamic that I am
positing within the context of criminal law. Through the American criminal
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legal system, people of color fortunate enough to receive the full
complement of trial proceedings often expect, and largely receive, a special
brand of justice that is reserved only for their kind, a brand of justice simply
not imposed on their white or white-identified counterparts. Part I, on race
and capital punishment, discusses the effect that race has on skewing the
rate of death sentences imposed on non-white defendants. This section also
addresses the connections between slavery, lynching, and capital
punishment, and suggests that there is a close relationship between
individual racial biases and systematic or institutional inequalities. Part II
focuses on a specific example of the institutional inequalities in the form of
a race-based application of otherwise race-neutral drug laws in the city of
Seattle. Part II also reveals a pattern of official decision-making that seems
inextricably tied to race. Finally, Part III develops a general sketch of one
of the defining characteristics shared by the separate but equal era and our
current criminal justice system: a fear of, and desire to restrict, the
expression of black male sexuality. This section also looks at popular
conceptions of black male sexuality as a way to understand the scope of
individual, racially animated behaviors. In short, these sections are
designed to show that just as in the pre-Brown era of separate but equal
education, black life and liberty are less important than white life and
opportunity. A parallel system of justice has evolved that ensures that the
equality of which those children dreamt at a small school in Little Rock,
many years ago, remains both within sight and eternally out of reach.

I. RACE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: KILLING BOTH BODY AND
SPIRIT
The disproportionate application of the death penalty against blacks and
other people of color convicted of capital crimes typifies the way in which
criminal law has internalized the separate but equal ethos. This section
evaluates the historical foundations and other causal factors that produce
racial disparity in capital punishment. It also evaluates the statistical
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correlation between the race of the victim or the offender and the imposition
of the death penalty and some of the ways in which individual actors in this
process exercise discretion that produces unbalanced results. In short, this
section characterizes the modern death penalty mechanism as a legacy of
the practice of lynching, as the act of imposing the death penalty relies on a
misguided construction of the American legal regime as colorblind. Simply
stated, the very refusal to confront racial sensitivity in the imposition of the
death penalty effectively resurrects the separate but equal strategy.
By no means is the application of a separate but equal framework to the
criminal justice system a new development.5 Instead, the drastic statistical
disparity that we see in the pursuit and application of the death penalty
against black defendants charged with violent crime is merely the
contemporary account of long-established biases of the criminal justice
system.6 Not only are blacks many times more likely to receive the death
penalty than a similarly situated white defendant, but black defendants are
vastly over represented in the general prison population (and specifically on
death row) when compared to the size of the black population.7 As
shocking as the disproportionate rate of state-sanctioned killing of black
men is, there are only a few examples in which an individual with the power
to change the system has actually done so.8
In order to appreciate the breadth of the disproportion problem, we must
take a close look at current death row population studies to confront the
reality that the use of the death penalty as a special punishment for people
of color is not just an anomalous problem of a few rogue states, but is a
replacement strategy for the official, overt forms of discrimination which
were defeated in the civil rights era. Recent statistics from federal death
row show that 68 percent of those awaiting death are black, while only 29
percent are white.9 When we compare those numbers to the pre-civil rights
period from 1927 to 1963, we see that 79 percent of those executed on
federal death row were white, and 8.8 percent of those executed were
black.10 Currently, across the nation, about 42 percent of the approximately
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3,500 death row inmates are black, while 46 percent are white, and about 10
percent are Latino.11 Inexplicably, blacks represent only 12 percent of the
general population,12 yet they are three times more likely to be on death
row, and they are about 4.3 times more likely than an otherwise equivalent
white defendant to be sentenced to death for the same crime.13
Is this discrimination? The fact that approximately 50 percent of murder
defendants and victims are black14 may suggest that murder is largely a
crime committed against same-race victims. But, if we then look at the
effect of the race of the victim, we begin to realize that a black life simply is
worth less than a white life. Although about 50 percent of all homicide
victims are black,15 only 13.77 percent of individuals of any race executed
killed black victims,16 whereas 80.29 percent of those executed killed white
victims.17 Further, even though black defendants accused of killing a white
victim represent 8.1 percent of the homicides from year to year,18 black
defendants convicted of killing a white victim made up 21 percent of those
executed.19 In contrast, white defendants accused of killing a black victim
represent 3.2 percent of the homicides from year to year,20 but only 1.32
percent of those executed are white defendants who have been convicted of
killing a black victim.21 The crime is the same, but the level of justice
imposed depends on the color of one’s skin.
There are myriad causes for this obvious disparity given the forces that
are embedded in the many individual decisions and determinations that
affect the fate of a black defendant prior to trial and sentencing. Beginning
with discretionary choices made by investigating law enforcement officers
and continuing through the prosecutor’s charging decisions, a largely allwhite criminal enforcement complex determines whether to apprehend a
black suspect and whether or not to charge the suspect with a capital
crime.22 Both the overrepresentation of blacks in the prison system at large,
which is approaching 44 percent,23 and the disproportionate representation
of blacks authorized for federal death penalty prosecution from 1988 to
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1998, which is approximately 59 percent,24 bear witness to these official
tendencies.
Moreover, once a defendant is actively facing prosecution, there are
several potential sources of bias, including the race-based selection of jurors
in capital cases.25 In jury selection, there is a strong correlation between
jurors who support the death penalty and their racial identity. For example,
73 percent of whites express a positive position on capital punishment, in
comparison to only 46 percent of blacks.26 Also, not only are prosecutors
both expressly and subtly encouraged to make use of that difference,27 but
an overwhelming number of black federal and state death row inmates have
had their convictions handed down by all-white juries.28
Unfortunately, the modern imposition of the death penalty is a legacy of
the nation’s practice of slavery. During slavery, the American criminal
code made it very clear that it reserved harsher punishments for blacks (of
any legal status) than those punishments authorized for whites.29 On both
an individual level and in the legal sense, crimes committed against whites,
especially those committed by blacks, were considered the most serious.
An extra-judicial death penalty for blacks was the norm.30 Of course, we
know that officially-sanctioned and mob-induced lynching was the
technique of the day, which was designed to both intimidate blacks and
reinforce their status as non-human property.31 We also know that the
practice of open lynching, which occurred in both the North and the South
(and often included freedmen), was eventually suppressed in order to
preserve the opinion of our nation.32 However, an overtly racist death
penalty, characterized by swift, judicially sanctioned executions at the
conclusion of sham trial proceedings, quickly stepped in to fill the void.33
Thus, the subjugation of the black community to the will of a white
majority continued, which served to legitimize the arbitrary assassination of
black folks at the hands of the state.
Now, for those who find this to be objectionable evidence depicting a
practice designed to execute blacks in order to keep them firmly situated in
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an inferior social class, the prospects for change are less than encouraging.
First, reform of this dysfunction is complicated by the apparent raceneutrality of the various death penalty enforcement regimes.34 There are no
codes that explicitly call for the application of the death penalty because of
race, yet statistics show that race is an extremely important factor in
predicting the application of capital sentences.35 Moreover, it is unlikely
that we will hear confessions from jurors admitting that they were swayed
by a desire to see a black man pay, with his life, for the insolence of
committing a crime against a white life. The current legal system simply
lacks any mechanism for identifying and rooting out such improper
motives; instead, it presumes that those who instinctively employ race as a
cognitive sorting criterion can, and do, disregard race simply because they
are told to.
Second, any hopes for a balanced, truly race-neutral application of the
death penalty must be dampened by the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to
squarely address the problem. In death penalty disparity cases, ending with
McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court has hobbled any meaningful chance to
describe and rectify the problem of race in capital punishment cases. Both
on a state and national level, the Court has refused to consider the statistical
results of institutional racism as proof or proxy for the racist decisionmaking itself.36 Apparently, the Court was not persuaded by the fact that
blacks are being killed by the government faster than any other group
through the government’s use of procedures which have produced
erroneous determinations of guilt. The message, to everyone involved, is
that we are currently getting precisely what we deserve from the criminal
justice system.
The current criminal justice system effectively reproduces the conditions
and reiterates the inherent message of separate but equal education. Both
then and now, the country has had two regulatory regimes operating
simultaneously: one designed for white America, and the other designed for
black America. As in the separate but equal era, no one needs to be
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informed as to how the system operates because every person knows on
which side of the line he or she stands. But it may also be that with the
internalization and increasing transparency of race-based separate but equal
criminal law enforcement, the stakes associated with the perpetuation of
such a regime have increased substantially. Before Brown, it was separate
restrooms, drinking fountains, and seating in the back of the bus for blacks.
Now, the difference is literally between living white and dying black.
Sadly, those shuttled off to their death by the state are not the only
casualties of the disparate use of capital punishment against minority
offenders. The costs of this system are also imposed upon the surviving,
but not yet criminally identified, black and Latino/a populous as a whole.
To pay for the system, blacks and Latino/as must surrender their hopes for
fairness and equality, surrender their aspirations for a prosperous future of
opportunity, and accept the utter destruction of any sense of self that may
presuppose a fully liberated, free individual. Perhaps more than the
separate but equal educational system, the disproportionate use of capital
punishment to devalue black life itself conditions communities of color to
expect nothing more, and with that loss of expectation comes an acceptance
of what looks like, but should not in fact be, our fate.

II. BULL’S EYE: RACE AS THE TRUE TARGET OF THE SPD
NARCOTICS TASKFORCES
The popular conception that black crime and criminality are sui generis is
a basic assumption underlying the separate but equal approach to race and
criminal justice, even though evidence suggests that such notions are
empirically unsound. This section takes as its starting point a statistical
study, completed in November of 2003, which provides strong support for
the proposition that the Seattle Police Department enforces local drug laws
against residents in a manner disproportionately affecting people of color,
particularly blacks.37 After briefly summarizing the methodological design
of the study and demonstrating its relevant data indicators, this section
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seeks to explore some of the decision-making moments which lead to the
documented over-policing of minority drug offenders before making a few
observations about the effects this has on the community at large.
The study, which comes from and hits much closer to home here in
Seattle, was designed to answer two related questions. Given the rate at
which people of all ethnicities engage in criminal drug delivery, (1) are
blacks overrepresented among those arrested for serious drug delivery
crimes, and (2) are whites underrepresented among those arrests?38 The
answers to these questions are simply astounding, even to those of us who
have seen this machine in motion. Simply put, race radically affects one’s
chances of being arrested in Seattle for a drug law violation.
The study was based on several data sources, including census
information, medical indicators, local police records, and sociological
observations of two “open air” drug markets in Seattle.39 The first,
heterogeneous as to race (38 percent persons of color) at 2nd & Pike
downtown, and the second (over 90 percent white both in terms of buyers
and sellers) existing on Capitol Hill and centered around Broadway and
John.40
The study is premised upon two central, scientifically verified, behavioral
assumptions. First, habitual serious drug users overwhelmingly tend to
engage in conduct that also constitutes a drug delivery offense, which
produces a large statistical overlap between drug user communities and
drug deliverer communities.41 Second, across communities and regions,
people overwhelmingly engage in drug delivery transactions where the drug
sources match the ethnic or racial background of the client.42 This racial
congruity assumption basically says people “buy” from members of their
own ethnic or racial communities.43
Acknowledging these assumptions, the report reveals the following
realities: in 2000, Seattle’s black residents comprised 8.3 percent of the
total population, whereas white residents comprised 67.9 percent.44 In that
same period, whites represented 70.3 percent of all drug users, whereas
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blacks represented 13 percent of all drug users.45 Based on interviews, not
arrests, about 51.4 percent of people acting as sources for all drugs were
white, while blacks made up only 14.5 percent of sources for drugs.46
The problem, however, is that the Seattle Police Department data
collection on the rate of drug interdiction shows that white arrestees
represented 17.6 percent of suspects, while African Americans accounted
for 64.2 percent of those arrested for drug delivery.47 In all, blacks
represent 7 percent of users, 14 percent of sources for drugs, and 62 percent
of arrestees. Further, these rates are largely consistent no matter how the
data is manipulated, across substances. The data shows that any given drug
deliverer is approximately 3.6 times more likely to be white than black, and
that any given drug buyer/user is approximately eleven times more likely to
be white than black. In terms of going to jail, however, statistics show that
a black drug seller is anywhere between 22 and 31 times more likely to be
arrested than a white drug seller, depending on the substance.48
Again, is this racism or do blacks really commit the lion’s share of drug
crimes in Seattle? Statistics simply do not allow the latter conclusion.
Possible alternative factors such as the Seattle Police Department’s
aggressive focus on cocaine interdiction, or even the Department’s frequent
use of the buy-bust technique, do not explain away the problem.49 Blacks
are simply vastly overrepresented in the ranks of arrestees, regardless of the
drug type or arrest technique involved.
Indeed, the Department’s practices and policies that appear to be at the
root of this disproportionate infliction of criminal sanctions for drug crimes
against blacks are clearly identifiable. A primary factor is the Department’s
focus on racially diverse open-air drug markets, particularly those markets
which have a substantial African American presence. Not surprisingly, the
Seattle Police Department does not treat predominantly white markets with
the same zeal. For example, the latest statistics show thirteen arrests in the
U-District, eighteen arrests on Capitol Hill, and 548 arrests at 2nd and Pike.50
Finally, even within mixed markets, the disproportionate targeting of black
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suspects cannot be explained by statistical use rates or the prevalence of
persons of color. Instead, these are conscious tactics that perpetuate the
subjugation of people of color, by all appearances undertaken by design,
which simply cannot be accounted for by race-neutral criteria.51
How do we extricate ourselves from this deepening dilemma? There is
still a great deal of denial as to the cause and effect relationship between
race and criminal interdiction (on all sides), and there is a real risk that
documenting and quantifying the bias seemingly inherent in these
enforcement patterns has the potential to open an irretrievable rift in the
already tense relations between specific police departments, the criminal
justice system generally, and the communities of color that they serve.
Thus, the challenge for us may be to develop an aggressive, but reasonable,
alternative to unjust treatment before all hope of reconciliation fades.
What we cannot do is continue to turn a blind eye to clear indications that
the Black Codes of the post-civil war era are being informally resurrected in
our contemporary penal system. Some may read the foregoing as a
suggestion that the police should disregard drug dealing by blacks to
ameliorate the disparity, but this is certainly not my contention. To the
contrary, I would argue that the solution lies not in reduced enforcement,
but in neutral enforcement. That is, a drug enforcement regime that targets
people for their behavior rather than for their race is the best mechanism for
avoiding the actual or apparent condition wherein particular crimes are
defined and disproportionately enforced against minority communities.
Such neutral enforcement is the only mechanism that both fosters the
necessary faith and allegiance to the rule of law and that keeps communities
of color invested in our collective social enterprise.

III. CRIMINAL LAW AS A MEANS OF REGULATING BLACK
SEXUALITY
Finally, I want to end my submissions on the modern separate but equal
doctrine in the application of criminal law with what appears to be a more
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complex, and perhaps anecdotal, condition. The story that I want to tell was
reported in the New York Times a few months back and comes to us from
the great state of Georgia.52 It is the story of Marcus Dixon, a well-regarded
high school senior, honor student, football star, and black man living in a
predominantly white part of Georgia, who was arrested last year for having
sex with a fellow student that he knew from class.53 She was a young white
woman, just shy of turning sixteen-years-old when the incident occurred.54
While there is certainly conflicting evidence regarding their encounter, Mr.
Dixon was acquitted of rape charges and was convicted of the lesser
offenses of statutory rape and child molestation.55 Bound by Georgia’s
sentencing guidelines, the judge gave Mr. Dixon a 10-year minimum
sentence and sent him away to pay his debt to society.56
What is wrong with this picture? Nothing, obviously, but that is part of
the problem. This story harkens back to the slavery and post-abolition
practices of using the criminal law to restrain the perceived threat of black
sexuality and to preserve the sexual purity of white women. Rape laws,
when situated historically, were inherently race-based laws that operated on
a de facto classification of black men as rape offenders57 and of white
women as rape victims.58 These laws were intimately associated with both
lynching59 and with the death penalty as a sanction for the actual or alleged
black sexual aggression against white chastity.60 To illustrate, over a forty
year span, 405 of 455 men executed for rape in the United States were
black. 61
For their internal consistency, ordered rape laws and their attendant
penalties depend upon the paradigmatic caricature of black male
heterosexuality as “promiscuous [and] threatening to white women, and as .
. . unmatched [in] sexual prowess.”62 This myth of the black male is a
consequence, at least in part, of the former economic nature of the black
male as a promiscuous and potent “breeder” of new slaves.63 However, the
same fecundity attributed to the black male, which measured in part his
value as a chattel, was simultaneously perceived as a threat to the monopoly
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on white female sexuality.64 This perceived monopoly was built on the
perception that female white chastity was a property interest for the white
male class; the perception was founded upon a set of gender norms that
construct women as frail, vulnerable, and sexually helpless beings.65
Black male sexuality was also considered to be so menacing, at least in
part, because of the perceived allure that the exotic, ravenous black man
held for white women, who apparently could not be trusted to resist
themselves.66 This perception of black male sexuality caused rape laws to
racially evolve in a hierarchical social context. Moreover, the attendant
assignment of racial and sexual identities to the binary offender and victim
roles provided a formative blueprint for an inherently discriminatory yet
nominally colorblind legal doctrine; the very facial neutrality of rape laws,
in spite of the manner of their application, is precisely what gives them their
sustenance.
What we cannot see on the face of the news reports concerning Marcus
Dixon is the way in which both the race of the victim and the race of the
suspect influenced the individual actors’ choices. For example, we are
unable to see what influence race had on the prosecutor’s decision to charge
an aggravated child molestation count and to reject plea offers, and on the
jurors’ credibility determinations regarding conflicting testimony and
witness inconsistencies. What is clear, and perhaps most damaging, is how
the community in which this case arose perceives “justice” to depend on the
race of the individual who seeks it.
The ideas implicated by these discretionary decisions spring not just from
their historical legacy, but also from several more recent sources. Ideas
about race are both hereditary and environmental. The pathology of racial
bias can reflect both the inclinations we receive from our parents, and the
ways in which those inclinations are nurtured during one’s upbringing. In
terms of direct inheritance, it is basic human behavior for children to learn
to navigate and to create order in their perceptual world by mimicking the
behaviors and actions of their parents and caregivers. As social animals,
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many of the important techniques we learn represent subtle communicative
or expressive behaviors that indicate a mental or emotional disposition and
are taught unconsciously, like smiling upon and making eye contact with
one another, or laughing at the appropriate time when a joke is told. The
racist ideals and perceptions of one generation are transmitted, admittedly
imperfectly and often incompletely, to the succeeding generation in the
same manner. A child watching or listening to a parent express or manifest
a racialized construction of the world, in particular a construct regarding a
crime or sexual conduct, will internalize these norms and will then use them
as a basis for the child’s own mapping of the subjective social landscape
that this child will negotiate for the rest of his or her life.
Moreover, contemporary popular culture continues to deploy
stereotypical images that presume inherent black criminality, which offhandedly celebrate the kind of animalistic sexual passions supposedly
encapsulated in the black male body, in ways that pluck at the racial chord
which spans generations of Americans. The prospect for change in public
opinion appears to be severely hampered by these notions and expectations
of black criminality,67 which are pandered to through media depictions of
black culture.68 You cannot live in this culture without being aware of
movies and music videos that both glamorize black violence and use visual
and other sensory cues to play on stereotyped formulations of the black
man, particularly, as the eternally latent, if not presently active, criminal.69
The news media furthers that effort by sensationalizing instances of black
criminality, especially when white victims are involved, and it largely
ignores, or at least underreports both black-on-black violence and white-onblack violence.70 To illustrate, when was the last homicide or rape reported
in the news that did not mention the race of the suspected perpetrator?
These same vehicles reinforce distorted perceptions about modern black
sexuality. Music videos are replete with images of the “porn star”: hulky
black men, often shirtless, heavily muscled, oiled-up, and encircled by
throngs of scantily-clad voluptuous women (black and white) simulating
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sexual activity. Music videos also depict black men as the “pimp”:
stunningly dressed, draped in gold, climbing out of a $200,000 automobile
flanked by his fur-clad and Prada-clad “hos.”71 These caricatures of black
sexuality are far too valuable for story-telling for them not to be included in
movies and television programming. The images appear everywhere you
turn—from Sheriff Bart’s implicitly sexual query, “where all the white
women at?” in the movie Blazing Saddles,72 to the “baby’s mama”
syndrome of Jerry Springer and the paternity test spectacle.73 These media
practices further entrench culturally transferred assumptions about who the
law is meant to regulate, and who it is meant to protect.
These modern social tendencies demonstrate that black crimes
(specifically sex crimes) are systematically constructed as different; they are
separate and distinct from white crimes, both prospectively and
retrospectively. Before allegations of criminal activity arise, there exists an
expectation that blacks and people of color, specifically black men, will
eventually manifest suspicious or dangerous behavior. These expectations
affect official police tactical decisions and law enforcement patterns, victim
or witness credibility determinations, and evidence gathering techniques.
After a person has been accused of committing a crime, societal beliefs
about the significance of the racialized actor’s illegal conduct will infuse
public and judicial determinations not only with respect to innocence or
guilt and appropriate sentencing, but it will also infect an individual’s
attempt to challenge the propriety of his prosecution or conviction from the
outset.
This is precisely the technique that was employed during the era of
explicit separate but equal justice formulations. Under such a system,
assumptions about race were used as a basis on which to prospectively
design an overt two-tiered approach to social regulation. Likewise, racist
beliefs were used pre-Brown as a post-hoc justification to answer questions
regarding the fundamental fairness of such a two-tiered approach. That
such a method of lawmaking can persist today, that it can even possibly be
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involved in the administration of justice for just one case (Marcus’ or
anyone else’s case) may give us legitimate cause for substantial concern and
alarm.
The idea is that the racialized history of rape and other criminal
sanctions, in particular the application of the death penalty in response to
allegations (real or concocted) of black-on-white sexual violence, set the
stage for the inherently color-sensitive criminal law regime that we
currently “enjoy.” By uncritically accepting this historical legacy as
integral to our contemporary body of laws and the structure of our criminal
enforcement complex, and without seriously asking whether times have
changed to such an extent that we can operate a criminal justice system with
such a questionable legacy, our nation has tolerated an approach to criminal
law that provides ample room for the expression of the racial, and often
racist, perceptions in modern society.
However, these perceptions and the decisions that they infect are a
reflection not just of historical nineteenth century notions of race, but of
contemporary, active, and pervasive associations between racial identity and
criminal character. The point is that the separate but equal form of criminal
justice is not simply a legacy of the past; the technique of using criminal
laws to broadly regulate minority populations cannot be studied only in
hindsight. This is a persistent, ever-new dysfunction of contemporary
American society that is reiterating, not reverberating, a race-based criminal
justice system that was nominally dismantled in the middle of the twentieth
century. Current fears about unrestrained black male heterosexuality, which
are both created and reinforced in popular culture, provide the up-to-date
animus necessary to perpetuate an inherited race-based justice system
whose racist ideals were philosophically, if not practically, repudiated in
Brown. Perhaps to our eternal detriment, even in this regard, American
ingenuity never rests.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, it appears that the promise of Brown is
incomplete, and that we have not yet fully realized the potential of the great
idea manifested therein. It also appears, however, that the fundamental
premises of Brown remain vulnerable and are subject to attack.
Furthermore, retrenchment in our public consciousness threatens to render
that great legal victory pragmatically useless in our everyday lives. Still, it
is proper to celebrate the spirit of Brown. This issue of the Seattle Journal
for Social Justice is in print because of the Brown decision, and because so
many people of color have penetrated the ranks of educational institutions
and have achieved other professional successes that were categorically
foreclosed to our predecessors. With that admission, how can the failure of
Brown be fairly suggested?
It is true that this landmark decision is our reason for being here in more
ways than one. Brown is of enduring importance to the battle for racial
equality that is still being waged in this country, but not because as a matter
of precedent it can solve the problems outlined above. It is precisely on this
latter point that Brown is a substantial failure. However, to see it only in
this way asks too much of the opinion, of the Court, and too much of any
legal institution.
The social pathology that is racism is a problem of human, not
institutional, proportions—it infects institutional decision makers, not their
office. There is no pronouncement that can be issued from on high that can
forcibly alter the cognitive map and the array of values that make up each
individual human character. Instead, Brown offers the greatest promise as a
catalyst for social change when we recognize that the decision itself cannot
unweave the fabric of racism in which American society is cloaked, and
when we admit that the issuance of this decision does not, by any means,
end the struggle. It is far too easy to rely on a written opinion as a
substitute for an actual change in the circumstances and experiences of a
racialized society, and it is too easy to use the existence of an opinion, with
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its declaration that separate but equal must end, as an obstacle to resist
further movements or efforts towards true social and sexual equality.
However, if Brown itself embodies a disposition of the heart, a vision of
human character, and related notions of individual liberty, integrity, and
precious freedom, then our social duty is to embrace that notion on an
individual basis in order to begin living the values that the Court could
model for us, but never effectively imposed. It is this model of justice, one
that is not colorblind but color honest, which can and must prevail against
insidious hangover notions of black criminality and against defining our
legal system’s concept of justice by reference to unfounded constructions of
race.
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